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and no superiority of numbers sufficient to enable them to dispense with those advantages. There are no remote provinces which can act for themselves. The soldiers are everywhere, and everywhere in irresistible force. The people see that clearly; they perceive that if it ever comes to a struggle the Kings must win, and the heart, therefore, is in great measure taken out of their devotion to Radical ideas. They think it, in fact, safer to let the Kings have their way, so long as their way is endurable, than by resisting too far, to provoke them to apply the final and irresistible argument of military force unhesitatingly exerted.

"We all see how this idea operates in Germany, where the Emperor is allowed to talk as if he were a heaven-descended autocrat, and it is just as influential in Austria, though in a different way. Everybody knows in the Dual Monarchy that there is a point at which the Emperor, patient as he is, would suspend any one of his many Constitutions, and govern a recalcitrant province through the Army, and he is, therefore, never pushed beyond that point. It is just the same in Russia, though the fact is there concealed by the willingness with which a people accustomed to autocracy accepts the Tsar's decrees as more likely to be wise than those of anybody else. If the German people attempted to control the army, or if the Austrian people resolved to 'federalize' the army, or if the Russian people tried to diminish the army, the Sovereign in either country would call upon his soldiers, and the people would be forced to shrink back visibly helpless.

"Indeed, the change goes even further than that. The people are not only more powerless to resist than of old, but they are less willing. They have all been in the ranks, have all imbibed a soldierly dislike of mutiny, and are all, therefore, as disinclined to oppose the Sovereign as soldiers are to disobey the commanding officer. They have a sense of doing wrong when they resist the 'War Lord,' or even hesitate to accept his command; a sense which when they do it, as in Germany the Socialists do, inspires them with an unnecessary, and, as it were, unnatural, brutality and violence. This new organization, under which the Army is an irresistible caste, and this new feeling, immeasurably strengthen the Kings, and induce them to maintain fearlessly their new attitude of final arbiters, without whose consent in the long run nothing can be accomplished. They may not have a complete initiative, but they have a completely efficacious veto. The German Emperor may not be able to say that a great navy shall be created, but he is able to say that the detested law of *lèse majesté* shall be retained, and shall be acted on with even increasing severity, and the people are as powerless as if they were children.

"On whatever point, in fact, a continental king is resolute to the point of fighting, his subjects must give way, or be shot down. The difficulty which stands in the way of all reform, and which makes even the mention of disarmament a thing to be treated with derision, is this, that the Sovereigns will not give up the control of their armies, and the victory of the 17th century cannot now be repeated, for the peoples cannot become strong enough to resist forces so immense; and as to the idea, so widely though so secretly entertained, that discipline may give way, that the armies, to speak plainly, may mutiny, it is unsupported by any tittle of evidence. The soldiers did not mutiny when they were much worse treated than at present. So far as appears, they hate the idea of such a course, as fatal to their own strength as well as their own

sense of professional honour. If there is one thing certain in military history, it is that ordinary men, once armed and drilled and brigaded, acquire a feeling that they are distinct from the population, develop what may be called a national life of their own, and cease to be governed by the views, or aspirations, or grievances of the unarmed people. They stand apart, responsible, as it were, to a different conscience. This has just been signally proved in France.

"The universality of conscription, has not affected this feeling in the least, nor has the shortness of modern service in barracks. The newest recruits obey as readily as the oldest veterans. There is no likelihood whatever of the populace debauching the soldiery, and just as little of any transfer of allegiance from the Kings to Parliaments. The soldiery, in fact, even in England, and still more on the Continent, dislike Parliaments, which seem to them, accustomed as they are to rapid and final decisions, to be mere talking bodies, utterly undisciplined and obeying their officers only where they happen to agree with them. The soldiers might mutiny to seat a Pretender, or to increase a military ascendancy, or to get rid of grievances in their own ranks — though these things do not now-a-days occur in well-disciplined armies — but they will not, we may rely on it, mutiny to increase the power of Parliaments, that is, in fact, to develop the authority of civilians over soldiers.

"That idea, then — the hope of practical reformers — must be abandoned. But it touches a line of fact which must be reckoned with, and behind which lurks a great danger. The conflict of modern times is really one between the masses and the classes, or more correctly between the military class and the civilian — the former being the instrument of the classes."

Is all this, in another generation, to be true of America into which militarism is making slow and insidious inroads?

The Terrible Condition of Affairs in Cuba.

We take from the speech of Senator Proctor, delivered in the United States Senate on March 17, such sections as reveal the awful state, as seen by him, to which Cuba has been reduced by the contest which has been going on now for three years. No one who can lay claim to the least remnant of manhood can read the accounts which have come to us, which the Senator confirms, of the desolation and suffering there existing, without wishing to the deepest depths of his soul that the whole accursed system of war might be banished at once and forever from the world. Much might be said in extenuation of the United States taking up the sword to stop these inhumanities, *provided* she could do it without extending the existing ones indefinitely and committing a long series of new ones, the necessary attendants of any war. But the great crime which our country, in its present state of civilization, would commit in going to war over the state of things in Cuba, would be the giving of its support to the keeping alive of the system of war, which will always produce in one way or another just such inhumanities as now exist in Cuba. It always has done so; it can never do otherwise; there is no civilized method of warfare. Senator Proctor says:

"There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the ex-

ception of Mantanzas, extending the whole width of the island. My observations were confined to the four western provinces, which constitute about one-half the island. The two eastern ones are practically in the hands of the insurgents, except the few fortified towns. These two large provinces are spoken of to-day as 'Cuba Libre.'

"Havana, the great city and capital of the island, is, in the eyes of the Spaniards and many Cubans, all Cuba, as much as Paris is France. But, having visited it in peaceful times, and seen its sights, the tomb of Columbus, the forts, Cabanas and Morro Castle, etc., I did not care to repeat this, preferring trips in the country. Everything seems to go on much as usual in Havana.

Outside Havana all is changed. It is not peace, nor is it war; it is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village is surrounded by a *trocha* (trench), a sort of rifle pit, dirt being thrown up on the inside and a barbed wire fence on the outer side. These *trochas* have at every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are there called forts, but which are really small blockhouses, loopholed for musketry and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each. The purpose of these *trochas* is to keep the *reconcentrados* in as well as to keep the insurgents out.

From all the surrounding country the people have been driven into these fortified towns, where they subsist as they can. They are virtually prison yards, and not unlike one in general appearance. Every railroad station is within one of these *trochas*, and has an armed guard. Every train has an armored freight car, loopholed for musketry and filled with soldiers and with, as I observed usually, and was informed is always the case, a pilot engine a mile or so in advance.

There are frequent blockhouses, inclosed by *trochas* and with a guard, along the railroad track. With this exception, there is no human life or habitation between these fortified towns and villages, and throughout the whole of the western provinces — except to a very limited extent among the hills, where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and burn their dwellings — I saw no house or hut in the 400 miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio province in the west across the full width of Havana and Matanzas provinces, and to Sagua la Grande on the north shore and to Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish *trochas*. There are no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and pastures. In other words, the Spaniards hold in these four western provinces just what their army sits on. To repeat, it is neither peace nor war — it is concentration and desolation. This is the "pacified" condition of the four western provinces.

West of Havana is mainly the rich tobacco country; east, so far as I went, a sugar region. Nearly all the sugar mills are destroyed between Havana and Sagua. Toward and near Cienfuegos there were more mills running, but all protected by *trochas* and guards. It is said that the owners of these mills near Cienfuegos have been able to obtain special favors of the Spanish government in the way of a large force of soldiers, but that they also, as well as all the railroads, pay taxes to the Cubans for immunity. I had no means of verifying this. It is the common talk among those who have better means of knowledge.

All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified

towns when Weyler's order was made, were driven into these towns, and these are the *reconcentrados*. They were the peasantry, many of them farmers, some land owners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches, and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family. It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these people was very different from that which prevails in this country. Their standard of comfort and prosperity was not high, measured by our own. But according to their standards and requirements their conditions of life were satisfactory. The first clause of Weyler's order reads as follows:

"I order and command, first, all the inhabitants of the country, or outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered as a rebel and tried as such."

The other three sections forbade the transportation of provisions from one town to another without permission of the military authorities; directed the owners of cattle to bring them into the towns; prescribed that the eight days shall be counted from the publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal district, and state that if news is furnished of the enemy which can be made use of it will serve as a recommendation.

Many, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the *guerillas* to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed that in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and that the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the *guerillas*.

When they reached the town they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the *trochas*, and left to live if they could. Their huts are about 10 by 15 feet in size, and, for want of space, are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, no furniture, and, after a year's wear, but little clothing, except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize, and with large families, or with more than one, in this little space. The commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Conditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half have died, and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved? A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children are seen walking about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless. Deaths in the streets have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that they have been found dead about the markets in the morning where they had crawled hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the markets, surrounded by food.

These people were independent and self-supporting before Weyler's order. They are not beggars, even now. There are plenty of professional beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the

reconcentrados, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them makes an appeal stronger than words.

Of the hospitals I need not speak. Others have described their condition far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with the strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents, and they had given free play to a strong, natural and highly cultivated imagination.

Before starting I received through the mail a leaflet published by the *Christian Herald*, with cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took it with me, thinking these rare specimens, got up to make the worst possible showing. I saw plenty as bad, and worse; many that should not be photographed and shown. I could not believe that, out of a population of 1,600,000, 200,000 had died within the Spanish forts — practically prison walls — within a few months past, from actual starvation and diseases caused by insufficient and improper food.

My inquiries were entirely outside of sensation sources. They were made of our medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of relief committees, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated. What I saw I cannot tell so others can see it. It must be seen with one's own eyes to be realized. The Los Pasos Hospital, in Havana, I saw, when 400 women and children were lying on the stone floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of rags — and such rags! Sick children, naked as they came into the world. And the conditions in the other cities are even worse.

Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me. I had known and esteemed her for many years, but had not half appreciated her capability and devotion to her work. I especially looked into her business methods, fearing that there would be the greatest danger of mistake, but everything seems to me to be conducted in the best manner possible. In short, I saw nothing to criticise, but everything to commend. The American people may be assured that their bounty will reach the sufferers with the least possible cost and in the best manner in every respect.

When will the need for this help end? Not until peace comes and the reconcentrados can go back to their country, rebuild their homes, reclaim their tillage plots, which quickly run up to brush in that wonderful soil and clime, and until they can be free from danger of molestation in so doing. Until then the American people must, in the main, care for them. It is true that the alcaldes, other local authorities and relief committees are now trying to do something, and desire, I believe, to do the best they can, but the problem is beyond their means and capacity, and the work is one to which they are not accustomed.

General Blanco's order of November 13 last somewhat modifies the Weyler order, but is of little or no practical benefit. Its execution is completely in the discretion of the local military authorities, and though the order was issued four months ago, I saw no beneficent results from it worth mentioning. I do not impugn General Blanco's motives, and believe him to be an amiable gentleman, and

that he would be glad to relieve the situation of the reconcentrados if he could do so without loss of any military advantage, but he knows that all Cubans are insurgents at heart, and none now under military control will be allowed to go from under it.

There are — or were before the war — about 1,000,000 Cubans on the island, 200,000 Spaniards (which means those born in Spain), and less than half a million of negroes and mixed blood. The Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood, and, like the Spaniards, usually dark in complexion, but oftener light or blond, so far as I noticed, than the Spaniards. The percentage of colored to white has been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years, and is now not over 25 per cent. of the total. In fact, the number of colored people has been actually diminishing for nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and laborer is by nature peaceable, kindly, gay, hospitable, light-hearted and improvident. One thing that was new to me was to learn the superiority of the well-to-do Cuban over the Spaniard in the matter of education. Among those in good circumstances there is no doubt that the Cuban is far superior in this respect. They have been educated in England, France or this country, while the Spaniard has only such education as his own country furnished.

The colored people seem to me by nature quite the equal, mentally and physically, of the race in this country. Certainly, physically, they are by far the larger and stronger race on the island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this has doubtless been greatly to their advantage."

The Logic of War.

BY KATRINA TRASK.

Where is the logic of war — O ye

Who wave the flag, and who cry the cry

"We fight in the name of humanity;

Let those who have killed prepare to die!

Down with the demons who blew up the Maine! —

The Spaniards, perchance, who Cuba have slain?"

Alas! if they have, what then — O ye

Who wave the flag and who cry the cry?

I ask in the name of humanity;

Shall we be like them and make men die?

Shall a hundred warships, instead of one,

Reek red in the light of the rising sun?

Must the burden of infamy increase?

Shall more cruel engines with shot and shell

Drown the voice of the Prince of Peace

And make of the earth a vaster hell?

Where is the logic, the sense of war —

To do the dark deeds that were done before?

Woe to that nation which steepes in blood

Its own right hand! 'Tis easy to die —

But to kill imperils our highest good;

The Lord God rules in His Heaven on high;

Let Him be arbiter over the lands —

But for Christ's sake lift to Him bloodless hands.

NEW YORK CITY.